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Recent Developments
KEY ESCROW ENCRYPTION POLICIES AND TECHNOLOGIES*
DOROTHY E. DENNING**.
WILIAM E. BAUGH, JR.***
I. INTRODUCTION
N today's information age, encryption is considered essential to
ensure the security of electronic data and transactions. At the
same time, however, there is growing recognition that the spread of
powerful encryption technology is not entirely beneficial. As en-
cryption proliferates worldwide, it could seriously imperil the ability
of law enforcement agencies to counter domestic and international
organized crime and terrorism, because terrorists, drug dealers and
others can use the technology to facilitate crimes and to operate
with impunity. Furthermore, proliferation of encryption could
eliminate valuable sources of foreign intelligence which have been
vital to national security. Encryption additionally has potential
drawbacks within individual businesses. For example, if encryption
keys are lost or damaged, valuable data may become inaccessible.
Similarly, employees can use encryption to cover up fraud, espio-
nage and other crimes.
In response to these concerns, in April 1993, the Clinton ad-
ministration announced an initiative to promote encryption in a
way that would simultaneously satisfy the competing objectives of
security and privacy on one side, and public safety and national se-
curity on the other.' This was to be accomplished primarily
through the adoption of "key escrow" encryption standards and
* This Recent Development is available at the Villanova Law Review home
page at http://vls.law.vill.edu/academic/jd/ournals/law-review/Volume_41/.
Additionally, an earlier version of this Recent Development, with the footnotes,
appeared in Information Systems Security, Summer 1996.
** Professor of Computer Science, Georgetown University; B.A., 1967, M.A.,
1969, University of Michigan; Ph.D., 1975, Purdue University. Dr. Denning's home
page is available at http://www.cosc.georgetown.edu/-denning/.
*** Vice President, Information Technology and Systems Sector, Applications
International Corporation, McLean, VA; former Assistant Director, Information
Resources Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation; B.A., 1967, Louisiana Poly-
technic University; J.D., 1969, Louisiana State University School of Law.
1. White House Press Release, Statement of the Press Secretary, Apr. 16, 1993,
1993 WL 357773; also available at http://library.whitehouse.gov.
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products. 2 Key escrow encryption makes use of special data recov-
ery keys which are held by a trusted fiduciary to enable backup
decryption. Use of the backup decryption capability is restricted to
users and to government officials who have been authorized to ac-
cess the encrypted information.
By providing a mechanism for authorized government access,
key escrow products would have another advantage: they would be
exportable. Currently, United States law defines encryption prod-
ucts as munitions, which cannot be exported without a license.5
Businesses have objected that export regulations have made it more
difficult for them to obtain strong encryption to protect interna-
tional communications. Similarly, U.S. manufacturers of computer
products complain that the regulations put them at a competitive
disadvantage in the global marketplace. The Administration's 1993
initiative proposed allowing the export of stronger encryption prod-
ucts which used the proposed key escrow idea.4 While more recent
proposals have modified the original 1993 initiative, permitting the
2. Id. at 1.
3. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (1994); 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1, 121.1, 123 (1995). Con-
gress, through the Arms Control Export Act (ACEA), has given the President the
authority "to control the import and the export of defense articles and defense
services." 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1994). The President designates certain prod-
ucts as "defense articles," which then constitute the U.S. Munitions List. Id.; see 22
C.F.R. § 121.1 (1995). Cryptographic systems or software "with the capability of
maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information" are included in Category
XIII(b) of the U.S. Munitions List. Id. Further, the President may "promulgate
regulations for the import and export" of items on the Munitions List. 22 U.S.C.
§ 2778(a) (1) (1994). These regulations are known as the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR), found at 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (1995). The Munitions
List is actually a part of ITAR, found at § 121.1. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1995). To
export an item included in the Munitions List, such as cryptographic software, one
must obtain an export license from the Office of Defense Trade Controls of the
Department of State. Id. § 123.1 (a).
ITAR and ACEA are currently being challenged in the Northern District of
California and the District of Columbia as unconstitutional. See Bernstein v. U.S.
Dep't of State, C 95-0582 (N.D. Cal., filed Feb. 21, 1995); see also Ty Decoding the
Latest in Munitions Wear, CHI. DAILY L. BuL., Nov. 14, 1995, at 2 (stating that sup-
port for Bernstein's constitutional claims "also can be found in the government's
own internal legal opinions questioning the regulation's constitutionality"); Jared
Sandberg, Judge Rules Encryption Software Is Speech in Case on Export Curbs, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 18, 1996, at B3 (stating that ruling clears way "for the judge to rule that the
government's limitation on the export of encryption is unconstitutional"). But cf.
Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, No. 95-1812 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 1996) (granting defend-
ants' motion to dismiss APA claim as nonjusticiable, and granting defendants' sum-
mary judgment motion with respect to constitutional claims against ACEA and
ITAR).
4. See White House Press Release, Statement of the Press Secretary, Feb. 4, 1994,
available at http://library.whitehouse.gov (announcing "[n] ew procedures to allow
export of products" using key escrow encryption).
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export of stronger encryption products which use key escrow en-
cryption remains central to the government's reform efforts.
This Recent Development critiques the most recent Clinton
administration proposals to include key escrow in U.S. encryption
export policy.5 Part II outlines the major proposed changes to U.S.
export policy.6 Part III offers an overview of different approaches
to key escrow.7 Finally, the Administration's proposal is contrasted
in Part IV with international efforts at implementing key escrow.8
II. PROPOSED CHANGES TO U.S. ENCRYPTION EXPORT POLICY
As part of the government's early efforts to modify encryption
export policy through the use of key escrow technology, the Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA) developed an initial implementation
of escrowed encryption in a microelectronic chip called the Clipper
Chip.9 Although Clipper offered strong, exportable encryption, it
was widely criticized on four accounts: (1) its encryption algorithm
("Skipjack") was classified, 10 (2) it required special hardware, (3)
the government held the keys and (4) it did not accommodate user
data recovery.
Following the Clipper initiative and the criticisms which fol-
lowed, the government began working with industry personnel to
develop a more flexible approach to key escrow that would address
the objections raised over Clipper and meet the needs of users, in-
dustry and the government. In August 1995, the Clinton adminis-
tration announced a new proposal to allow the general export of
5. Since this article was written, the Administration has issued a new key es-
crow proposal. For more information, see http://www.cosc.georgetown.edu/
-denning/crypto.
6. For a discussion of the Clinton Administration's proposed changes to en-
cryption export policy, see infra notes 9-37 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of key escrow approaches and products, see infra notes 38-
46 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of international efforts to implement key escrow policies,
see infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
9. See White House Press Release, supra note 1, at 1. Clipper is a "state-of-the-
art microcircuit" which "scrambles telephone communications using an encryp-
tion algorithm." Id. For further description of the Clipper Chip and its key escrow
system, see Dorothy E. Denning & Miles Smid, Key Escrowing Today, 32 IEEE Comm.
58 (1994), also available at http://www.cosc.georgetown.edu/-denning/crypto.
Clipper advanced beyond the theoretical stage before it was eventually scuttled; for
example, AT&T integrated the chip into a telephone security device to provide
secure voice communications.
10. Because the algorithm is classified and not open to public review, outside
experts were invited to examine the algorithm and to report their findings to the
public. No weaknesses were found. See Earnest F. Brickell et al., Interim Report: The
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software encryption products with unclassified algorithms of up to
64-bit keys, provided that the products were combined with an ac-
ceptable key escrow mechanism." Keys would be held by govern-
ment-approved trusted parties within the private sector (not by the
government as with Clipper), where they could support user data
recovery in addition to authorized government decryption. 12 The
proposal, which is still undergoing refinement as of March 1996, is
already being used as a basis for granting general export licenses
for key escrow products.
The first part of the Administration's proposal would allow the
general export of encryption products using up to 64-bit keys.
Under current U.S. export policy, software encryption products
with keys longer than 40 bits are exportable only by obtaining a
license from the Department of State.13 Additionally, any vendor
wishing to export such a product must apply for a separate license
for each customer or obtain a special distribution arrangement.' 4
By comparison, products with key lengths not exceeding 40 bits
may be readily exported under general licenses administered by the
Department of Commerce.' 5 Consequently, many products devel-
11. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, NIST 95-24, COMMERCE'S NIST ANNOUNCES PROCESS FOR DIALOGUE ON KEY
ESCROW ISSUES (Aug. 17, 1995), available at gopher://gopher.nist.gov.79/0/.docs/
.releases/n95-24.rel. As part of the proposal, the Administration also announced
plans to develop a FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) for key escrow
encryption implemented in software. Id. The standard would be used by federal
agencies and other interested organizations in conjunction with FIPS-approved en-
cryption techniques.
12. Id.
13. The ITAR Regulatory structure, discussed supra note 3, does not specifi-
cally differentiate between encryption software using more or less than 40-bit keys.
However, after the Software Publisher's Association (SPA) urged the government
to stream-line the export licensing process, the National Security Agency (NSA)
agreed to expedite mass-market software for export if such software uses keys not
longer than 40-bits. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, A
STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE WITH ENCRYPTION
(Redacted Copy of Original Secret Document) 11-4 (1995) (on file with author).
The 40-bit rule is sometimes referred to as the "SPA Agreement." See Ira S. Rubin-
stein, Export Controls on Encryption Software, in INTERNATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC INSTI-
TUTE 1995: GLOBAL CHALLENGES 11-12 (1995). Software using keys longer than 40-
bits do not fall within this agreement, and the Department of State would retain
jurisdiction. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (1995).
14. See generally 22 C.F.R. § 123.1 (1995).
15. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, supra note 13, at
11-5 (stating that SPA Agreement "ensures transfer of licensing jurisdiction [of en-
cryption software using up to 40-bit keys], after a one-time review by NSA, to the
Department of Commerce, where the products are freely exportable"). After an
initial review by the Department of State, the product may be granted a commodity
jurisdiction transfer to the Department of Commerce. Id. There, it can be ex-
ported to most places without the need to obtain a license for each sale. For a
4
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oped by U.S. companies for the international market use 40-bit
keys.
The longer the key, the harder it is to break the code.
Although 40-bit keys provide adequate protection for most applica-
tions, they are not foolproof. For example, in the summer of 1995,
a French student cracked one in eight days, using 120 workstations
and a few supercomputers. 16 The key gave him access to a dummy
purchase order that had been encrypted with the overseas version
of a popular program for browsing the World Wide Web.17 Even
though a substantial investment of resources was required just to
crack a single message, many potential users regard the incident as
an indication that 40-bit keys are unacceptably small.
As a result, some U.S. companies complain that they have lost
sales to foreign competitors who were able to provide stronger en-
cryption, including the Data Encryption Standard (DES),18 which
uses 56-bit keys. They cite the worldwide availability of products
using DES and other encryption algorithms as evidence that export
controls limit U.S. companies' competitiveness in the global mar-
ket. As of December 1995, Trusted Information Systems of Glen-
wood, Maryland, had identified 497 encryption products from
twenty-eight countries, 193 of which used DES.19 In some cases,
software vendors have been forced to build separate product lines
for domestic and foreign sales in order to meet the demands of
U.S. customers for DES or better encryption.
Some critics contend that the proposed increase from 40 bits
to 64 bits is minimal, and that U.S. export policy should allow even
greater key lengths. However, each additional bit doubles the
number of possible keys and thus the effort required to crack a key.
The proposed additional 24 bits, therefore, gives about seventeen
million times better security. It would have taken the French stu-
dent 136 million days-or about two billion computers in eight
days-to crack a single 64-bit key. At the current rate of technolog-
ical advancement, it will be several decades before the French stu-
detailed treatment of export controls as they apply to encryption software, see Ru-
binstein, supra note 13.
16. See Jared Sandberg, French Hacker Cracks Netscape Code, Shrugging Off U.S.
Encryption Scheme, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1995, at B3.
17. Id. The software was Netscape's "browser" program. Id.
18. For a general discussion of DES, see National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Data Encryption Standard (DES), Federal Information Processing Stan-
dards Publication (FIPS PUB) 46-1, Apr. 1977.
19. David M. Balenson, Worldwide Survey of Cyyptographic Products, Presented at
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dent could break a 64-bit key in eight days with updated computers.
64 bits is therefore likely to provide a reasonably high level of secur-
ity for at least the next twenty years.20 Further, if a company sends
out numerous messages per day, each encrypted with a different
key, the task of an adversary to break all keys with the hope of find-
ing some message worth reading becomes increasingly impractical.
For the near term, DES combined with key escrow can provide
strong security while being implementable in exportable software
products. Despite its- age,21 DES still offers robust encryption and
may have a decade or more of useful life remaining. For the longer
term, DES can be replaced with a readily exportable 64-bit
algorithm.
As a balance against the increased acceptable key length, the
Administration's proposal requires encryption products to provide
acceptable key escrow mechanisms. Draft criteria for export of
software key escrow encryption were issued in September 1995, and
then refined and re-issued in November for comment.22 Meetings
were held at the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) in September and December to discuss the criteria and to
solicit comments from industry.
The proposed export criteria are intended to ensure that the
government can, when lawfully authorized, readily access keys and
decrypt intercepted communications and stored information in a
timely manner. Accordingly, products must include information in
the encrypted data that identifies the escrow agent(s) and the par-
ticular keys needed for decryption.23 Further, keys must be held by
escrow agents certified by the U.S. government or by foreign gov-
ernments with which the U.S. government has formal agree-
ments.2 4 The conditions under which companies could hold their
own keys has not yet been determined.
Under the criteria, compliant products must allow access to en-
crypted communications from both ends of the channel.2 5 This al-
20. Not everyone agrees that 64 bits provides adequate encryption. A report
by an ad hoc group of cryptographers and computer scientists recommends that
keys be 75-90 bits long. Matt Blaze, et al., Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers
to Provide Adequate Commercial Security (January 1996), available at http://
www.bsa.org/bsa/cryptologists.html.
21. DES is now about 20 years old: See Encryption: Secret Plans, ECONOMIST,
May 6, 1995, at 80.
22. Draft Software Key Escrow Encryption Export Criteria (11/95 version),
available at http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/keyescrow.
23. Id. at criteria 4.
24. Id. at criteria 3.
25. Id. at criteria 5 ("The product's key escrow feature shall allow access to the
294 [Vol. 41: p. 289
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lows communications sent both to and from a subject of
investigation to be decrypted using only the subject's keys. Compli-
ant products must also allow for the decryption of multiple
messages during a period of authorized access without requiring
repeated presentations of the access authorization to the escrow
agent(s) 26
Additionally, products must be designed to resist alterations
that would circumvent or disable the key escrow mechanism. 27 The
escrowed encryption functions must interoperate only with es-
crowed functions in other products and must not interoperate with
products whose key escrow features have been altered or disabled.
Exportable products will be allowed to use keys up to 64 bits long,
but they must not provide multiple encryption modes that effec-
tively increase the key length.2 8 For example, the criteria will allow
the use of DES, but not triple-DES, which uses two keys (112 bits) or
three keys (168 bits).
The draft criteria for escrow agents, released at the December
1995, NIST meeting, address the requirements for escrow system
integrity and security and for key access. 29 Escrow agents will be
required to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
key escrow information and the confidentiality of requests for that
information. 30 Further, they will need to ensure due form of all
requests and respond to such requests in a timely fashion.31 Finally,
they will need to maintain audit records of all events relating to the
management and release of keysA2
To obtain a license under the new proposal, a vendor with a
candidate product would submit the product to the Department of
State for review. If the product is found to meet the criteria for
export, it would be granted a commodity jurisdiction33 transfer. It
would then be exportable under a general license administered by
the Department of Commerce.
key(s) needed to decrypt the product's ciphertext regardless of whether the prod-
uct generated or received the ciphertext.").
26. Id. at criteria 6.
27. Id. at criteria 9 ("The product's... functions... shall not interoperate
with the cryptographic functions of a product whose key escrow encryption func-
tion has been altered, bypassed, disabled, or otherwise rendered inoperative.").
28. Id. at criteria 8.
29. Key Escrow Agent Criteria, draft, Dec. 1, 1995, available at http://
csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/keyescrow.
30. Id.
31. Id. at criteria 2.
32. Id. at criteria 9.
33. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (1995).
1996] 295
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Reaction to the government's proposal has been mixed.
Trusted Information Systems (TIS) and TECSEC, Inc., submitted
products for review and are likely to be joined by other companies;
TIS has received approval for their Gauntlet firewall. Some major
corporations which are adopting corporate key escrow policies to
protect their own interests have stated that the government's pro-
posal might meet their goals if they can hold their own keys. The
Software Publisher's Association 4 and the Business Software Alli-
ance35 both issued statements calling for the liberalization of export
controls independent of whether key escrow is used. A coalition of
nearly forty public-interest groups, trade associations and represent-
atives for industry led by the Center for Democracy and Technology
(CDT) sent a letter to Vice President Gore in November 1995 say-
ing that the proposal did not address the need for immediate liber-
alization of export restrictions and that it was no substitute for a
comprehensive national cryptography policy.3 6 The CDT-led coali-
tion pledged to develop an alternative proposal within six months.
Despite these criticisms, we believe the proposal is a major step
forward. It would allow a vendor to develop a single product line
for both domestic and international sales, using software or hard-
ware implementations of the 56-bit DES or an even stronger 64-bit
algorithm. This step should facilitate the seamless integration of
strong encryption into network and applications software, thereby
making it cheaper and easier for businesses to encrypt their elec-
tronic transactions and proprietary data. Furthermore, this step
will facilitate electronic commerce. If strong algorithms are imple-
mented in both domestic and international products, businesses
will be able to communicate securely with customers, suppliers,
partners, investors and subsidiaries throughout the world.
Some vendors and users may not accept the 64-bit limit on
keys. One company has stated that the proposal would not alleviate
its need to continue manufacturing two product lines, because it
uses 128-bit keys in its domestic products.3 7 Some critics of the
34. SoFTwARE PUBLISHER'S ASSOCIATION, COMMENTS OF THE SOFTWARE PUn-
LISHER'S ASSOCIATION ON 11/95 DRAr EXPORT CRITERIA FOR KEY ESCROW ENCRYP-
TION, Presented at the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST)
(Dec. 5, 1995).
35. Robert W. Holleyman II, President, Business Software Alliance, Encryption
Export Policy and the U.S. Software Industry: Chipping Away at America's International
Competitiveness, Testimony at NIST (Dec. 5, 1995), available at http://www.bsa.org/.
36. A copy of the letter is available at http://www.cdt.org/.
37. NETSCAPE POLICY ON ENcRYPTION EXPORT (distributed at meeting at NIST,
Dec. 5, 1995), available at http://www.netscape.com/newsref/ref/encryption
_export.html.
296 [Vol. 41: p. 289
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limit argue that because access is possible through the key escrow
system, there is no reason to restrict key size at all. The govern-
ment's response has been to note that given the limited experience
with key escrow, the strength afforded by 64-bit keys might pose
significant national security risks. After key escrow systems have
been more widely deployed and found effective, perhaps longer key
lengths will be permitted. However, we believe that 64-bit keys are
more than adequate for virtually all business transactions. The in-
creased key length, combined with the key escrow concept, prop-
erly balance the competing interests of the government and the
business community.
III. KEY ESCRow APPROACHES AND PRODUCTS
While there is no single approach to escrowed encryption, all
methods follow a few general principles.38 The data recovery key
used with a particular encryption product is generated by or given
to a trusted party sometime before the product is used. For exam-
ple, it might be generated and escrowed while the product is being
manufactured or when the product is initialized and registered with
an escrow agent. The key could be unique to an individual product
or user, or it could be shared by many users. Additionally, it could
be held by a single escrow agent, or it could be split into several
components, with each component held by a separate entity.
Whenever the product encrypts a document (or message
stream), the product attaches to the encrypted document sufficient
information to allow backup decryption. For example, the data en-
cryption key might be encrypted under the data recovery key and
placed in a document header. If the encryption key is later lost,
then the user or an officer in the user's organization would give
that information to the escrow agent and request assistance. After
determining that the request is authentic, the escrow agent either
would release the data recovery key (if it is unique to the user) or
else use the key to determine and release the data encryption key.
If an investigative or intelligence agency needs access to the key
during the course of an authorized search or communications in-
tercept, the agency would present certification of the legal author-
38. For a description of the characteristics of key escrow encryption systems
and different proposals, see Dorothy E. Denning & Dennis K. Branstad, A Taxon-
omy of Key Escrow Encryption, 39 COMM. OF THE ACM, No. 3, Mar. 1996, at 34-40.
The taxonomy, plus detailed descriptions of 30 systems, including all those men-
tioned in this article, can be found through http://www.cosc.georgetown.edu/
-denning/crypto. See also Dorothy E. Denning, Key Escrow Encryption: The Third
Paradigm, COMPUTER SECURrrYJ., Summer, 1995.
2971996]
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ity to access that information (normally a court order) to the
escrow agents. Legitimate privacy interests can be protected
through access procedures, auditing and other technical, legal and
operational safeguards.3 9
The Clipper Chip represents one approach, implementing the
Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), a voluntary government stan-
dard for encrypting sensitive but unclassified low-speed telephone
communications, including voice, fax and data.40 Each chip has a
unique data recovery key, which is split between two government
escrow agents: the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) and the Department of Treasury Automated Systems Divi-
sion. Data are encrypted with the classified Skipjack algorithm,
which uses powerful 80-bit keys. Products that implement the EES
must use tamper-resistant hardware in order to protect the classi-
fied algorithms. They are generally exportable.
The Clipper Chip is a scaled back version of a more advanced
chip, called Capstone, which the NSA developed for use in the
Fortezza card (a PCMCIA4' card). The goal was a small, affordable
and extremely secure hardware token that would provide a full
suite of cryptographic services for confidentiality protection, au-
thentication and digital signatures.
Capstone implements the EES plus public-key cryptographic al-
gorithms for the Digital Signature Standard and for generating and
establishing session keys. A Fortezza PCMCIA modem card is also
available so that encryption and decryption can be performed
either as part of the transmission protocols or as independent ser-
vice calls, for example to encrypt or decrypt files and electronic
mail messages. The government plans to extend the scope of the
EES to cover high speed communications over computer networks
so the Fortezza and other Capstone-based devices will meet approved
standards for use by federal agencies.
Clippes key escrow system supports backup decryption by au-
thorized government agencies, but does not help users with lost or
damaged keys. Fortezza, on the other hand, was designed also to
allow user data recovery. This is accomplished through the certifi-
39. With some approaches, key escrow is a service provided by the trusted
parties that manage the public-key infrastructure and issue public-key certificates.
Issuance of a public-key certificate may be conditioned on the user escrowing the
corresponding private key with the certificate authority.
40. National Institute for Standards and Technology, Escrowed Encyption Stan-
dard (EES), FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION (FIPS PUB)
185 (1994). See also Denning & Smid, supra note 9.
41. Personal Computer Memory Card International Association.
[Vol. 41: p. 289
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cate authorities which grant certificates for the public keys used for
key establishment and digital signatures. Those same authorities
escrow the user's corresponding private keys, which are stored on
the Fortezza card; the keys can be recovered from the certificate au-
thority in case the card is lost or the keys become corrupted.42
Some type of key escrow is a feature or option of several com-
mercial products including Fisher Watchdog, Nortel's Entrust, PC
Security's Stoplock KE, RSA Secure and TECSEC Veil. With all of
these products, escrowing can be done within the user's organiza-
tion. In some cases, it is integrated into the company's key manage-
ment infrastructure. Bankers Trust has developed a commercial
key escrow system, called Secure KEES, that uses third party escrow
agents. 43 Keys, which are stored on hardware cryptographic tokens,
can be split between multiple agents. TIS has developed a commer-
cial key escrow system which could be used with either hardware or
software encryption products." National Semiconductor has pro-
posed to implement the TIS system using their PersonaCard (a
PCMCIA cryptographic card) with the goal of producing an export-
able product with strong security and data recovery capability.45
Other proposals have come from researchers at AT&T, Bell Atlan-
tic, Cylink, Fortress U&T, Karlsruhe University, Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, Royal Holloway and the University of
Wisconsin. All of these products and proposals are covered by a
taxonomy of escrowed encryption.46
The cost of key escrow is difficult to estimate, especially given
the wid&irange of approaches. One approach, used by Fortezza and
Entrust and adopted by several of the proposals, includes escrow
with the services provided by public-key certificate authorities. An-
other, used by Stoplock and Veil, integrates escrow into the overall
42. Although Fortezza was developed as part of the NSA's Multilevel Systems
Security Initiative (MISSI), the technology is available commercially. Support for
Fortezza has already been added to AT&T's SecureAgent, Netscape's Navigator, Or-
acle's Secure Network Services and other products.
43. Bankers Trust Electronic Commerce, Private Key Escrow System, Presenta-
tion at the SPA/AEA Cryptography Policy Workshop, Aug. 17, 1995, and at the
International Cryptography Institute, 1995: Global Challenges, Sept. 21-22, 1995
(on file with author); see also Secure KEES product literature distributed at NIST
(Dec. 5, 1995).
44. Stephen T. Walker et al., Commercial Key Recovery, 39 COMM. OF THE ACM,
no. 3, Mar. 1996, at 41-47.
45. William B. Sweet & Stephen T. Walker, Commercial Automated Key Escrow
(CAKE): An Exportable Strong Enayption Proposal National Semiconductor; iPower
Business Unit, Sunnyvale, CA, June 21, 1995.
46. See Denning & Branstad, supra note 38.
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key management infrastructure. With both of these approaches,
the incremental cost of escrow may be relatively low.
Although the government's export proposal discussed above
explicitly addresses software encryption, hardware products may
also be considered for export. The advantage of hardware is that it
generally offers greater security than software. In addition, it can
better protect against tampering which would disable or circumvent
the key escrow mechanism. For this reason, hardware products
with key escrow might be approved for export with even longer
keys. Clipper and Fortezza, for example, use 80-bit keys with Skipjack.
Software has the advantage of being cheaper, but with mass produc-
tion, the cost of hardware need not be prohibitive, especially if the
encryption is combined with authentication mechanisms on a sin-
gle token that can be used for access control and other security
purposes (e.g., as with Fortezza).
We see a strong market for escrowed encryption products. In
recognition of the threats posed by uncontrolled cryptography,
some companies have already adopted internal security policies re-
quiring key escrow. For example, at the International Cryptogra-
phy Institute in September 1995, Nick Mansfield of Shell
International reported that key escrow is used in Shell Group enter-
prises. Keys are escrowed by a trusted Shell service company on
behalf of the shareholders and businesses, and this provides the
shareholders with an independent ability to decrypt information
should the need arise.
IV. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
Several products and proposals for key escrow have come from
outside the United States. Governments and businesses worldwide
are beginning to recognize the potential of key escrow for achiev-
ing information security without denying legitimate government ac-
cess. In addition to providing confidentiality and emergency
backup decryption, escrowed encryption is seen as a way of over-
coming export restrictions, common to many countries, which have
limited the international availability of strong encryption in order
to protect national security interests. With key escrow, strong ex-
portable cryptography can be standardized and made available in-
ternationally to support the information security needs of
international business.
At a meeting sponsored by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in December 1995, in Paris, repre-
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sentatives from the international business community and member
governments agreed to work together to develop encryption policy
guidelines based on agreed upon principles that accommodate
their mutual interests. The INFOSEC Business Advisor Group
(IBAG), an association of associations representing the information
security interests of users, issued a statement of seventeen principles
that they believe can form the basis of a detailed agreement. 47
These principles acknowledge the right of businesses and indi-
viduals to protect their information 48 and the right of law-abiding
governments to intercept and to lawfully seize information when
there is no practical alternative.49 Businesses and individuals would
lodge keys with trusted parties5" who would be liable for any loss or
damage resulting from compromise or misuse of those keys. 51 The
trusted parties could be independently accredited entities or ac-
credited entities within a company.52 The keys would be available
to businesses and individuals on proof of ownership 5  and to gov-
ernments and law enforcement agencies under due process of law.
Additionally, they would be available for a limited time frame.54
The process of obtaining and using keys would be auditable, and
governments would be responsible for ensuring that international
agreements would allow access to keys held outside national
jurisdiction. 55
Further, the principles call for industry to develop voluntary,
uniform and international standards, and for governments, busi-
nesses and individuals to work together to define the requirements
for those standards.5 6 The standards would allow choices about al-
gorithm, mode of operation, key length and implementation in
47. INFOSEC Business Advisory Group (IBAG) statement, available through
http://www.cosc.georgetown.edu/-denning/crypto/IBAG.txt.
48. Id. at principles 1-5.
49. Id. at principle 6 ("[L]aw-abiding governments have the right, in the pre-
vention, investigation and prosecution of serious crime, lawfully to intercept and
lawfully to seize information for evidential purposes only, where there is no practi-
cal alternative.").
50. Id. at principle 7.
51. Id. at principle 11 ("Where Trusted Third Party agents hold keys on be-
half of businesses and individuals, they must accept liability for any direct or conse-
quential loss or damage resulting from misuse or unauthorised [sic] disclosure of
those keys.").
52. Id. at principle 7.
53. Id. at principle 8.
54. Id. at principle 10 ("Where Governments and Law Enforcement Agencies
do obtain keys under such processes, they must only be available for a specified,
limited timeframe.").
55. Id. at principle 9.
56. Id. at principles 12 & 13.
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hardware or software. Products conforming to the standards would
not be subject to restrictions on import or use and would be gener-
ally exportable. 57
EUROBIT (European Association of Manufacturers of Busi-
ness Machines and Information Technology Industry), ITAC (In-
formation Technology Industry Association of Canada), ITI
(Information Technology Industry Council, U.S.) and JEIDA (Ja-
pan Electronic Industry Development Association) also issued a
statement of principles for global cryptography policy at the OECD
meeting.5 1 The quadripartite group accounts for more than ninety
percent of the worldwide revenue in information technology. Ac-
knowledging the needs of both users and governments, their princi-
ples call for harmonization of national cryptography policies and
industry-led international standards.
Products conforming to the U.S. government's software key es-
crow export proposal would offer one set of options consistent with
the principles identified by the international business community.
Thus, it seems likely that if international standards are adopted,
then U.S. vendors will be able to develop products that simultane-
ously conform to the international standards and to the export
criteria.
V. SUMMARY
Key escrow offers a valuable service to individuals, organiza-
tions and society. By incorporating key escrow into its encryption
export policy, the government would safely be able to grant export
licenses for products using up to 64-bit keys without compromising
national security. Key escrow benefits lavi enforcement and pro-
tects businesses from a host of problems-from misplaced keys to
espionage. Further, the U.S. proposal is in line with various initia-
tives on the part of governments and industry worldwide which are
leading toward policies and standards for key escrow.
Because the government's proposed key escrow program is vol-
untary, there is no guarantee that criminals will choose it over un-
escrowed encryption. Nevertheless, the program satisfies an
important objective: terrorists and other criminals will be unable to
take government-sponsored codes and turn them against the gov-
ernment and society. Further, it is hoped that government
purchasing power combined with export controls will have some
57. Id. at principle 17.
58. EUROBIT-ITAC-ITI-JEIDA Statement, available at http://www.cosc.
georgetown.edu/-denning/crypto.
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positive influence on both the domestic and international market.
Finally, responsible corporate participation will ensure that entirely
inaccessible networks are not created, to the detriment of both gov-
ernment and industry.
15
Denning and Baugh: Key Escrow Encryption Policies and Technologies
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss1/6
